This paper presents theoretical and empirical analyses of experiments that test competing theories of altruism, including pure altruism (a preference for the well-being of others), warm glow (a good feeling from giving) and impure altruism (a combination of pure altruism and warm glow), These theories produce different predictions regarding crowding out, i.e., the reduction in private donations due to public spending. Variations on dictator experiments involving both students and charities examine the incidence of crowding out and provide a new direct measure of the effect of giving on feelings. The results suggest that crowding out is incomplete, i.e., less than dollar for dollar, and there is weak evidence of warm glow. The overall picture, however, is one of mixed feelings: giving may be associated with good or bad feelings, depending on the context. As a way to resolve various apparent inconsistencies, this paper proposes a theory of conditional altruism, which extends previous models to incorporate social norms that arise in the workplace, marketplace and laboratory.
The sentiment or affection of the heart from which any action proceeds, and upon which its whole virtue or vice must ultimately depend, may be considered under two different aspects, or in two different relations; first, in relation to the cause which excites it, or the motive which gives occasion to it; and secondly, in relation to the end which it proposes, or the effect which it tends to produce -Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 1759 Sentiments, (1809 , pg. 42
I. Introduction
Economists have long recognized altruism as an important force in economic activity. It was the first and, until fairly recently, only social preference integrated into economics on a wide scale. Gary Becker motivated his seminal 1974 paper on this topic by reference to the sympathetic feelings that factored prominently in the work of classical thinkers such as Jeremy
Bentham and Nassau Senior. Sympathetic feelings, or sentiments, are also at the core of Adam Smith's ethical theory and provide one side of the equation explaining unselfish acts, namely, the motive. The other side pertains to the purpose or social consequences of such acts. Along these lines, Becker related altruism to social conditions and allowed utility to be conditional on these such that giving could produce positive or negative marginal utility. Nevertheless, these aspects of Smith's and Becker's thinking have not factored prominently in most of the subsequent theoretical work on altruism. This paper reformulates the leading theories of altruism in the context of simple experiments designed to test their motivational and behavioral implications and presents a theory of altruism based on feelings and social norms.
In economic theory, altruism is typically understood to denote a preference that does not depend on any social conditions or norms, which I will call unconditional altruism. It is usually expressed as one person's preference for another person's (or other persons') material or psychic benefit, sometimes called pure altruism. Andreoni (1989) formally added the notion that giving produces a pleasurable feeling, called warm glow. This motive is formulated as the donor's preference for giving per se, distinct from the benefit enjoyed by the recipient. The altruistic motivation is sometimes attributed to warm glow alone, as in Harbaugh (1998) , or to a combination of pure altruism and warm glow, which Andreoni (1989 Andreoni ( , 1990 does and calls impure altruism. The assumed motive has significant implications for private fund-raising, intergenerational transfers, state support for charities and funding of public goods in general. A major focus of this literature has been the crowding out hypothesis: if gifts are motivated by pure altruism, public spending will crowd out private donations dollar-for-dollar. If, on the other hand, the motive is warm glow or impure altruism, crowding out will be incomplete. This paper presents theoretical and empirical analyses of new and previous experiments that test these competing conjectures regarding crowding out. In addition, the new experiments generate direct evidence on the role of emotions as a motive for giving that provide weak support for warm glow and, indeed, stronger evidence that giving can cause bad feelings. Overall, the results paint a picture of mixed feelings: they suggest a role for emotions but imply that giving can be associated with good or bad feelings, depending on the context. The combined evidence on crowding out and emotions support Andreoni's formal modification of the utility function and role for feelings, but inconsistencies remain with theories of unconditional altruism. To improve the explanatory power of these models, this paper proposes a theory of conditional altruism that extends them to incorporate social norms, similar to other work on social preferences. Whereas unconditional altruism seems a more appropriate approach for very personal relationships, such as parent-child relations, conditional altruism proves helpful in describing many of the less personal economic relationships that are governed by different context dependent social norms, including those in the workplace, marketplace and experiments examined here.
The results of many previous studies, including those of actual charitable giving as well as experimental investigations, cast doubt on the complete crowding out predicted by pure altruism. For example, Kingma (1989) finds only about 13% crowding out of public radio donations. Using a wider set of non-profit organizations and controlling for an endogeneity bias in grants, Payne (1998) comes up with a larger effect, but she still finds crowding out is incomplete at an average rate of about 50%. Most experimental studies employ public goods designs and come to similar conclusions. Andreoni finds incomplete crowding out in a nonlinear public goods experiment (1993) that persists after taking account of possible subject confusion (1995) , and he attributes this behavior to a combination of pure altruism and warm glow.
Subsequent studies have attempted to disentangle the relative influence of these two motives. In particular, Palfrey and Prisbey (1996, 1997) and Goeree, Holt and Laury (2002) represent important contributions that share certain common features including the use of linear public goods experiments and an analysis of decision error. In repeated public goods games, Palfrey and Prisbey (1996, 1997) found little or no pure altruism but significant evidence of warm glow and subject error. Goeree, Holt and Laury (2002) , on the other hand, employed one-shot public goods games in which the individual cost and group benefit of contribution varied independently and found significant evidence, not only of warm glow and error, but also of pure altruism. Nevertheless, the above results could be driven, in part, by factors not controlled in such studies, as their authors typically acknowledge. In the econometric studies, incomplete crowding out might, for example, also reflect imperfect information about the level of government spending or a concern by donors for status or prestige (see, for example, McGranahan, 2000) .
Despite certain advantages, public goods games are similarly vulnerable to potential shortcomings. As demonstrated in the studies cited above, they are associated with significant subject error, presumably because of their level of complexity and uncertainty. Moreover, their results could be additionally confounded by strategic considerations, as Bolton and Katok (1998) illustrate. This study attempts to minimize or eliminate these concerns by making the distributive ramifications of any transfers more transparent and by considering only evidence from variations on dictator games. In the basic version of this exercise, one group of subjects, called the dictators, receive a fixed sum of money, which they may then share, if they wish, with anonymous counterparts, or recipients, in another room. As the recipients have no recourse, this design eliminates the strategic and expectational elements of public goods experiments, and the simplicity of the design leaves little room for subject error. Different versions of the experiment vary the initial endowments of the dictators and recipients as well as the identity of recipients in order to explore the incidence and extent of crowding out and the motives for giving. In addition, the new treatments are conducted double blind, i.e., neither the subjects nor the experimenters know which subjects made which choices, so as to avoid other extrinsic rewards, such as social approval, which can also insinuate themselves into experiments (see Buchanan, Eckel and Grossman 1998) . 1 Feelings, or affect in the terminology of psychologists, are the other variable of interest in this study. The claim of warm glow is that donors, when they are generous, experience more pleasurable feelings, or positive affect. In the treatments introduced here, subjects complete questionnaires that include psychological measures of short run affect prior to and following the allocation decisions. Comparing changes in short run affect provides evidence on whether giving generates a warm glow for the giver. Affective measures have only been used in a handful of recent economics experiments (Charness and Grosskopf, 2001, Bosman and van Winden, 2002) , and this is the first use, to my knowledge, to examine directly the warm glow motive. Such measures have been widely employed in psychology for some time, but these instruments have been gaining rapid acceptance in economics, as evidenced by numerous recent publications in this area. Frey and Stutzer (2002 a, b) provide excellent surveys of economic studies in this area and of the reasons why economists are now serious students of and contributors to this literature.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II presents the theories of unconditional altruism and the experiments designed to test them. Section III contains the results of the experiments with respect to the issues of allocation decisions and affective motivation. Section IV introduces a theory of conditional altruism and applies it to the experimental results, and Section V concludes.
II. Theories of Unconditional Altruism and Experimental Design
This section discusses A) allocation decisions according to unconditional altruism, B) affective motivation for altruism and C) experimental procedures. I begin by briefly stating and formulating models of the theories concurrent to descriptions of the experiments.
A. Allocation Decisions
As previously discussed, the bulk of work on altruism has taken a rather parsimonious approach in which altruistic preferences do not explicitly depend on any social standards or norms. In the most common formulation in economics, sometimes referred to as pure altruism, an individual's utility is a monotonic function, not only of his or her own allocation, but also of the utility or material allocation of another (or others).
Consider the following relationship between two individuals: a donor (or dictator, in the dictator game) who is in a position to share something of value with another, the recipient. Let E be the (potential) donor's endowment of an allocable resource, X the amount of E he chooses to keep, x the amount of E he gives to a recipient, and e the recipient's endowment, that is, her allocation apart from any gift from the donor. Then let us write a purely altruistic donor's utility
Here u(X) represents the donor's material utility, that is, his utility from his own allocation. The donor's utility associated with the recipient may be written as a function of her utility or directly as a function of her allocation, as here, ) (⋅ f . I make the usual assumptions of positive but diminishing marginal utility in the arguments of the utility function, i.e., ,
The model of pure altruism in current paper, outlined above, follows the more traditional formulation in which utility is a function of the allocation of private goods. In the context of public goods, pure altruism has typically been formalized as a preference over the total allocation of the public good. Using this approach, Warr (1983) and Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) , among others, conclude that purely altruistic preferences imply complete crowding out: every dollar funded by lump-sum taxes and contributed by the public sector to the public good should crowd out one dollar donated by the private sector. The reason is quite simple: since people only care about the final allocations between the public good and their own private consumption, they should be indifferent about whether the public good is funded through their own voluntary gifts 5 2 The material and altruistic preferences in this paper are written as additively separable terms. This maintains consistency and comparability with other models in the social preferences literature (e.g., Ernst Fehr and Klaus Schmidt, 1999 , Konow, 2000 , Rabin, 1994 and some papers on public goods (e.g., Goeree, Holt and Laury, 2002) . Moreover, this simplifies the analysis by avoiding the necessity of making assumptions about cross partial derivatives. Although one can certainly make plausible arguments for non-zero cross partials (both positive and negative), the model used in this paper produces predictions consistent with evidence on both actual allocations and the form of actual affective preferences. Thus, I follow Occam's razor and adopt the simpler formulation.
or by involuntary tax transfers. They will simply reduce their private gifts by the amount of the tax. Nevertheless, studies of actual charitable giving have found crowding out to be incomplete, indeed sometimes negligible (e.g., Abrams and Schmitz 1978, Ribar and Wilhelm 2002) .
As an explanation for incomplete crowding out, Andreoni proposes that people experience a warm glow when they give, which, as he renders it (1990), implies that utility is a function of the gift itself, rather than of the utility or total allocation of the beneficiary. Andreoni formalizes warm glow in the context of the provision of public goods, but in the current setting, it can be interpreted simply as the following donor utility function
where I assume and . The donor is indifferent to the recipient's endowment, e, and it is not an argument of his utility function. Thus, the recipient's wealth or gifts from others do not affect the donor's gift. Andreoni's chief model is that of impure altruism, which combines warm glow and pure altruism. Formally, a utility function with impure altruism is
In this case, the donor cares about the well-being of recipient but also derives pleasure from giving per se.
Warm-glow and impure altruism are both consistent with the incomplete crowding out that has been found in public goods experiments. As Bolton and Katok (1998) point out, though, inferences about behavior that could distinguish pure altruism from warm-glow or impure altruism are confounded in public goods experiments by other effects. Even if subjects are purely altruistic, incomplete crowding out can be optimal in those experiments because of the roles for expectations and strategic considerations. As a remedy, Bolton and Katok adopt a dictator experiment and find evidence suggesting crowding out is incomplete but more extensive than previously estimated. Their experiment, however, does not permit one to determine whether incomplete crowding out is due to impure altruism or warm glow alone.
In the following discussion, I will use the above model first to demonstrate these claims about the Bolton and Katok experiment. Then I describe a new set of experiments and their theoretical implications for each of the hypotheses about altruistic preferences. One of the behavioral measures considered, and the central focus of prior studies, is the crowding out effect.
In the current context, this is the effect of a variation in the recipient's endowment, e, on the donor's gift to the recipient, x, or dx*/de, denoted c. As previously mentioned, theories of altruism differ with respect to their predictions about this value. Crowding out may be complete, that is, dollar-for-dollar such that c = -1, zero so that c = 0, or partial meaning -1 < c < 0. The focus of both the theoretical and, later, empirical analysis of crowding out is interior solutions, i.e., cases for which x*>0 in at least one of the comparison treatments. We disregard that proportion of dictators who never give anything (within the experimental parameters) because theories of altruism generate meaningful predictions only for agents for whom the marginal utility of giving at least sometimes exceeds marginal material utility. Moreover, within this group, predictions about x and c refer to mean values.
Tax experiment
Bolton and Katok (1998) introduced a version of the dictator experiment, which has been used in subsequent work, e.g., Eckel, Grossman and Johnston (2005) employed it to establish the sensitivity of crowding out to framing effects. In this experiment, the initial allocations to both dictator and recipient are set at $15 and $5, respectively, in one treatment and at $18 and $2, respectively, in a different treatment. That is, the donor's endowment, E (or the total amount that the donor has to allocate between himself, X, and the recipient, x), varies with the recipient's endowment, e, but the sum of the two,
, is fixed. Specifically, (E, e)∈{($15, $5),($18, $2)} and M =$20. I refer to this as the Tax experiment because it is as if the dictator is subject to an involuntary tax that is given to the recipient. Each subject participates in only one treatment, i.e., either the $15/$5 or $18/$2 treatment, and selects a gift. After the allocation decision, one of the two subjects in a pair is randomly chosen to be in the role of dictator for the actual payments.
Consider the case of an impurely altruistic taxed dictator, who faces the following maximization problem: 
Substituting the constraints into the utility function above, we solve the first order condition with
Applying the implicit function theorem to solve for ) ( * e x x = , we substitute this into the first order condition and differentiate with respect to e
Rearranging, we arrive at the following expression altruism, however, the gift itself is valued, and crowding out is partial or incomplete (-1 < c < 0).
Subsidy experiment
This study introduces a variation on the dictator experiment that, in a sense, approaches the motive for altruism from the opposite direction of the Tax experiment. It provides a direct test of warm-glow giving. In the Subsidy treatment, the dictator has a fixed endowment, in this case $10, and the recipient receives a smaller fixed endowment, in this case $4. Thus, the dictator's philanthropic intentions toward the recipient receive a subsidy, in the form of the $4 payment to the recipient. Dictator gifts in this treatment are then compared to dictator gifts in the Standard treatment in which the dictator receives a $10 endowment and the recipient receives no endowment. Thus, the dictator's allocations to self and counterpart sum to a constant, 
We solve for and substitute into this condition and differentiate it with respect to e
Rearranging, we have
For pure altruism, g = 0 and f u
, and for warm glow, f = 0 and c w = 0. ■ A purely or an impurely altruistic donor cares at least somewhat about the recipient's allocation and, therefore, reduces the gift when the recipient receives a positive endowment. The donor whose motivation is solely warm-glow, however, is indifferent about the subsidy, and his or her giving is unaffected by it.
In the public goods and Tax experiments anything short of complete crowding out is interpreted as unfavorable evidence on pure altruism and as favorable evidence on warm-glow.
The Subsidy experiment reverses the usual implicit bias of previous tests of altruism. Now the 9 point prediction concerns warm-glow, not pure altruism, and any crowding out at all can, by the same reasoning, be interpreted as favorable to pure altruism and unfavorable to warm-glow. In reality, of course, partial crowding out is no more favorable to one extreme than to the other.
Charity experiment
The Tax and Subsidy experiments explore the relationship of giving to variations in endowments. Another factor that has been associated with altruistically motivated behavior is the information a donor possesses about a recipient. In a standard dictator experiment using a fixed $10 pie, Eckel and Grossman (1996) examined gifts of student dictators to other anonymous students in one treatment versus those to a known charity (the American Red Cross) in another.
They found average gifts to the former to be less than those to the latter by a moderate but statistically significant amount. Eckel and Grossman attributed the larger donations to charity to differences in "information about the characteristics of the recipient," which affected the extent to which recipients were viewed as "deserving." Although their study did not elaborate this point, one can identify two dimensions of such information differences. One is qualitative and includes, for example, how information influences subject interpretation of the relevant social norm in the given context, e.g., fairness, need, etc. This question, however, belongs to the discussion later of conditional altruism, not the unconditional altruism considered here. A second dimension of information differences, which does have a place within the current discussion, is quantitative. That is, how does the amount of information about recipients affect giving? 4 One conjecture, which I will call the "familiarity hypothesis," is that dictators are more generous to recipients about whom they have more information. As a further test of this hypothesis, this study reverses the availability of information about recipients from the Eckel and Grossman experiment. For the Charity treatment, student dictators allocate to charities, whereby relatively obscure charities were selected so as to be unknown to most subjects, a fact that was confirmed in post-experimental questionnaires. Although all treatments were run double blind, in the Standard treatment already mentioned the dictators were familiar with the recipients. All subjects (dictators and recipients) met initially in the same room and knew one another at least by face (although no one ever knew who his or her counterpart was). In some cases, it was apparent that subjects knew one another personally before the experiment, as well. In the case of both the Charity and Standard treatments, dictators received an endowment of $10 (E=$10) and recipients were unendowed (e=$0 On the face of it, there is no reason to expect differences between the Standard and Charity treatments based on the theories of unconditional altruism, apart from the possible effect of familiarity described above. 5 The Charity experiment, however, also produces two additional pieces of evidence about warm-glow and altruism. One is the aforementioned measures of changes in short run affect, which were also elicited from subjects in the charity sessions. The second involves the choice of charities. In the charity treatment, dictators read similar descriptions of two charities, Childreach and Children International, that made some mention of the needs of the beneficiaries. They then completed a form indicating which of the two should receive their gifts. In about one-half of the forms, however, a sentence was added to the Childreach description that notified subjects that "Every $1 you donate to Childreach makes available an additional $3 from a matching grant, all of which will go to their programs in the field." If warm glow is the sole motive for generosity, the availability of this option should have no effect on the percentage of dictators choosing Childreach or on the level of giving. Any shift toward Childreach on the "matching grant" forms or increase in giving in that version, however, suggests that donors care about the well-being of recipients.
It is clear that a shift toward a matching grant charity can be expected among purely or impurely altruistic dictators. 
PROOF:
The utility function of an impurely altruistic dictator in the charity experiment is
, we solve the first order condition with respect to x
Solving for ) (
, substituting and differentiating with respect to κ yields
Rearranging, the per dollar effect of changing the matching grant multiplier for an impurely altruistic dictator is The reason for increased giving is straightforward: the marginal dollar value to the recipient, and therefore the marginal utility to the altruistic donor, of any dollar donated is increasing in κ .
We now turn to a brief discussion of the role of affect as a possible motivating factor for generosity.
B. Affective Motivation
Although such considerations were downplayed as economic theory was formalized, pleasures or feelings of benevolence counted among the motivations central to early economic thinkers. Andreoni (1989) returned feelings to the forefront of the discussion of altruism, positing that "people 'enjoy' making gifts" and derive a private benefit "like a warm glow" from doing so (pg. 1449). Whereas pure altruism represents a selfless concern for others, giving motivated by warm glow is viewed as selfish since it is undertaken to make the donor feel better.
In psychology, such feelings, or affect, and may be contrasted with cognition, which refers to mental activities involving the acquisition, storage and use of knowledge. Among psychologists a debate similar to the one in economics recently heated up about whether generosity is genuinely altruistic (or selfless) or instead egoistic. C. Daniel Batson and his collaborators (1987, 1988, 1997a, b) claim that generosity is affectively motivated by selfless empathy for persons in need. Cialdini and his colleagues (Cialdini, et al., 1997 , Neuberg, et al., 1997 , on the other hand, argue that benevolence is more cognitively motivated through identification and merging with others. Thus, helping is really directed toward oneself and is not truly selfless. Interestingly, economists and psychologists conceive of selfless giving in opposite ways: for economists pure altruism typically connotes a more cognitive and selfless consideration of other's needs, whereas warm-glow is an affectively motivated and selfish force.
Previous studies of warm glow and impure altruism have focused on the predictions regarding crowding out. Although it is true that warm glow implies incomplete crowding out, the converse is not the case: incomplete crowding, if present, could be due to factors other than warm glow. One possibility, for example, is what Thaler (1980) calls the endowment effect, which is a special displeasure agents experience when outcomes fall short of endowed levels. For a donor, or dictator in one of our experiments, this may be modeled by including a term, , ) (x g in the utility function that is formally identical to the warm glow term, except that the sign of its first derivative is negative, rather than positive. This formulation also results in incomplete crowding out. Whereas warm glow represents a good feeling from giving, however, the endowment effect incorporates a disutility from giving. Thus, one cannot necessarily point to incomplete crowding out as evidence of warm glow. 6 An alternate approach to investigating warm glow is to measure feelings and emotions themselves. Thanks to more than three decades of research, mostly by psychologists (e.g., Diener, et al., 1999) but also sociologists (e.g., Veenhoven, 1991) , on what is collectively called subjective well being, there are now well developed and extensively tested instruments for this purpose (see these two works for evidence on the statements that follow). Studies of subjective well being (or SWB) are typically based on self-reports, i.e., responses to questions, usually posed on a single occasion but sometimes sampled on multiple occasions. A common assessment technique is a single scale global measure of happiness, e.g., a question asking how happy the respondent is on a scale of one to nine. Other approaches focus on particular aspects of SWB such as satisfaction with life or specific types of positive and negative affect (anger, joy, fear, etc.). Satisfaction with life measures involve a more cognitive process of evaluation. Affective measures can be distinguished not only by whether they address positive (pleasant) or negative (unpleasant) affect, but also by whether they elicit reports of long-run or short-run states, to put this distinction in the terminology of economics. Long-run affect may be thought of as feelings and emotions reported overall, on average, or over a longer time period, whereas short-run affect refers to temporary feelings reported at the moment or over a short period of time. One stylized fact is that long-run affect is more stable whereas short-run affect exhibits wider fluctuation.
Most researchers find that multi-item scales, which are usually constructed from simple addition of responses to various questions, better capture latent SWB variables than global questions and display more desirable statistical properties. Comparative studies of self-reported SWB measures with other subjective and objective variables, including economic and other life conditions, reports of family and friends, and physiological measures, substantiate the meaningfulness of the self reports. Despite widely cited early contributions by economist Easterlin (e.g., 1974 ), however, this topic did not receive much attention in economics until very recently.
7 Since the late 1990s, however, research by economists in this area has grown rapidly,
and just a few of the many important contributions are Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (2001), Clark and Oswald (1994) , and Gruber and Mullainathan (2003 Only a handful of economics experiments, however, has employed measures of SWB.
The results of the binary allocation exercise of Charness and Grosskopf (2001) failed to establish any correlation between single-item, single-occasion self-reported happiness and relative payoffs that is significant at conventional levels. Bosman and van Winden (2002) , on the other hand, found an unfavorable relationship between several single-item, single occasion measures of positive and negative affect and subject willingness to harm another, either by taking income from another or by destroying one's own income to prevent another from taking it. Konow and Earley (2004) conducted a dictator experiment that examined the relationship between dictator generosity and numerous self-reported measures of SWB, controlling for income and any tendency for subjects to misrepresent their true SWB. Using different approaches to data analysis, the results of this last study point mostly in the same direction: dictator giving is favorably related to various long-run measures of happiness, affect and psychological wellbeing, but it is uncorrelated with measures of material well being and life satisfaction.
This study employs a similar design to that of Konow and Earley, although the current experiments include not only standard dictator and control treatments but also subsidy and charity treatments. Moreover, the present study investigates the relationship between giving and changes in short-run affect. That is, I examine warm glow as the motive for generosity that is based on the resultant improvement in the donor's feelings in the short-run. Thus, this study, in contrast to previous experimental studies in economics, focuses on changes in short-run affect derived from measures sampled on multiple occasions. Specifically, this change is derived from differences in dictator responses to items presented just prior to their allocation decision and then again just following it. These items are taken from the (1988) Mood Index that Batson, et al. similarly employ, which asks about current feelings to various items on nine point scales with endpoints such as bad mood-good mood, dissatisfied-satisfied, displeased-pleased, depressedelated, etc. In particular, I construct a scale, called SRA, from a subset of these items that seeks to tap into the two typical qualities of short run affect: temporary feelings and more extreme states.
For these purposes, the SRA scale is formed for each subject by simple addition of that subject's bad mood-good mood and depressed-elated items (as opposed, for example, to the more cognitive dissatisfied-satisfied item or the more moderate displeased-pleased item). One can then construct a change in short-run affect scale (SRAD) by subtracting short-run affect prior to the allocation (SRA1) from that immediately following the decision (SRA2). SRAD serves as our measure of changes in short-run affect used in the experiments described below. 8 A control treatment is identical to the standard dictator treatment and uses student recipients who receive no endowment beyond the show-up fee, except that dictators have no opportunity to give any of their $10 to their counterparts, a fact that was communicated to both groups between sampling SRA1 and SRA2. The control, which was conducted with a separate group of subjects, provides a basis of comparison for SRAD that permits examination of a possible selection bias among dictators in the other treatments.
C. Experimental Procedures
The design has been described in general terms above. The experiments consisted of four treatments: standard, subsidy, charity and control. The sessions typically involved 12 pairs of subjects: 12 dictators and 12 recipients, or 12 dictators only in the case of the charity session in which the recipients were charities. A few sessions were run with 11 (pairs) of subjects (or, in one case, 10 pairs) due to an unexpectedly large number of no-shows. There were 371 participants total consisting of 94 subjects in the four sessions of the standard treatment, 116 subjects in the five sessions of the subsidy treatment, 47 dictators in the four sessions of the charity treatment (plus 24 more from two sessions of a pilot version that is sometimes also reported) and 90 subjects in the four sessions of the control. Eckel and Grossman (2000) found that dictators recruited in the usual way in economics with publicized monetary enticements (I will call such subjects "mercenaries") are significantly less generous than those "required" to participate (whom I will call "conscripts"). In order to utilize a uniform recruitment method while avoiding the low variance typical of the gifts of mercenaries, I used only conscripts in the main treatments of the experiment. Specifically, subjects were undergraduates in introductory economics or psychology courses at a university in the western U.S. who signed up to satisfy a course requirement. 9 Total average compensation net of gifts was $10.50 for sessions lasting on average a little over 40 minutes, yielding average hourly compensation of about $15 per hour. After receiving their payments, 96% of subjects responding indicated they would be willing to participate in economics experiments again.
All subjects initially showed up at a common room, where they were individually registered, given a $5 show-up fee and randomly assigned to Room A or B (except in charity sessions, which had only one room). A double-blind procedure was adopted, that is, neither the subjects nor the experimenters knew who had chosen any particular responses or gifts.
Moreover, subjects were at no time told the purpose of the experiment. The anonymity measures were undertaken for two reasons. First, the goal was to identify generosity intrinsically motivated by altruism, not giving motivated by an extrinsic aim such as seeking social approval, including the approval of other subjects or the experimenter. Second, previous studies (e.g., Tom Smith, 1979) suggest that responses to questions about subjective well being are more candid when subject identity is better protected.
9 The subsidy and charity sessions are all new in this study, but we are able to use the two standard dictator sessions from Konow and Earley (2005) that consist solely of conscripts. The four control sessions here are also from the earlier study and consist mostly of conscripts. One of the four control sessions uses mercenaries, but that should not matter since gift size plays no role in this treatment (dictators in the control treatment do not allocate any gifts).
The experiment then proceeds as follows. All participants first complete a questionnaire related to subjective well being that includes the short run affect (SRA1) items. After 20 minutes, the forms are sealed, and the experimenter provides all subjects for the first time with the details of the payment procedures. Room A subjects (the dictators) are told that they are now being paid $10 for completing the questionnaires and, in the standard treatment, that the subjects in Room B
(the recipients) are completing the same questionnaires but receive no additional compensation.
In the subsidy treatment, Room A subjects are told that Room B subjects receive $4 for their work. Room A subjects have five minutes to allocate ten $1 bills and ten blank sheets between one envelope they will keep and another that will be given to a subject in Room B, making sure that the number of bills/blank slips in each envelope totals ten. In the control, they are told that Room A may now pocket their $10 payment, and they are given no opportunity to share with Room B subjects. After the allocation decision, subjects in both rooms have four minutes to complete brief Follow-up Questions, which include the short run affect items for the second time (SRA2). After returning all of these materials, subjects fill out receipts, Subject Pool Participation Slips (for their class credit), and a Subject Pool Questionnaire (anonymous demographic questions that confirmed the representativeness of the subjects).
The charity treatment is similar to the other versions, except for any reference to Room B subjects. Instead, subjects are told that they may give some of their earnings to one of two organizations. In this treatment they have an additional form in the allocation phase that includes brief descriptions of two charitable organizations, Children International and Childreach, adapted from the literature of the two charities. Both statements include as goals of the charities meeting the needs of poor people. Dictators indicate on this form the charity to which they want their gift to go or to neither, and put it in the Return envelope. In this treatment, the Follow-up Questions also ask whether the subject ever heard of either of these organizations prior to the experiment.
III. The Results
The presentation and analysis of experimental results parallel the theoretical discussion above and begin with the allocation decisions followed by the evidence on affective motivation. (3) and (4) show the mean and modal gifts, respectively, of only those dictators who gave some positive amount (the Givers). Because of the substantial number of dictators who gave nothing, differences across treatments are greater when one considers the means of Givers alone. The pattern is for gifts to be most generous in the charity treatment, next most generous in the standard treatment and least generous in the subsidy treatment. The results of the Bolton and Katok tax experiment are also summarized in Table 1 and show average dictator gifts are greater in the 18/2 than the 15/5 case.
A. Allocation Decisions
Post-allocation subject comments produced no evidence of subject confusion and suggested the straightforward design was successful in this regard. The one exception was the subsidy treatment, the greater complexity of which confused a few subjects. The problem, unique to this treatment, was a failure on the part of some Room A subjects to process properly the $4 payment to Room B subjects in their decision-making. A conservative estimate of the number of such subjects is six dictators whose stated goal in the post-allocation questionnaires was to divide the total amount available equally, but whose actions clearly contradicted this. Of course, this artifact is not random: four of these subjects gave $5, one $4 and another $0. Deleting them from the sample produces the Subsidy Subset with 52 observations. Although the subset does not differ significantly from the complete set (P=.61, two tail t-test), this choice of sample does make a difference for one test discussed below, so I note it now. Another data set issue is the Pooled Charity, which refers to results from the four regular Charity sessions as well as from two Pilot Charity sessions. The procedures of the Charity sessions were the same as those for the Standard and Subsidy sessions, with the exception of the requisite changes during the allocation phase.
The Pilot Charity sessions involved the same procedures during the allocation phase as the Charity sessions, but otherwise differed in several ways, including different survey questions and the presence of a thirteenth subject who served as monitor. Since mean gifts for the Pilot sessions do not differ significantly from those in the Charity sessions (P=.22, two tail t-test), I will combine them to form the Pooled Charity sessions when analyzing gifts. The SRA questions were not included in the Pilot session questionnaires, however, so when evaluating this variable I will use only the Charity sessions. The discussion of treatment effects begins with a revised analysis of the Bolton and Katok study. They note that comparing mean gifts of all dictators understates differences, because these are heavily weighted by zero gifts. They, therefore, test differences in means of Givers alone. A potential problem with this approach, however, is that differences in treatments may cause changes in marginal evaluations and, consequently, the percentage of Givers. For example, dictators in the Tax experiment whose gifts equal, say, $2 in the 18/2 treatment might choose $0 in the 15/5 treatment. In this study, therefore, I employ the following refinement: zero gifts are deleted from the distribution with a smaller expected fraction of such gifts and that same percentage of zero gifts is deleted from the other distribution. This leaves the increase in number of zero gifts in one treatment versus the other, in other words, it captures the transition of some gifts from positive to zero. Means are then calculated from these distributions.
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10 Allocations in the complete Subsidy treatment are somewhat more dispersed than the Subsidy Subset illustrated in Figure 1 , but the modal gift remains $3. 11 Actually, these "zero adjusted means" provide a conservative estimate of the change in giving since, for example, some dictators who give a positive amount in the 18/2 treatment might prefer a negative gift in the 15/5 treatment, Table 2 provides the zero-adjusted means and P-values from several tests of differences between them. The difference in means test is in keeping with our focus on mean behavior.
Given the non-normality of these data, however, two common two-sample non-parametric tests are also reported using the zero-adjusted data: Mann-Whitney (MW) tests shifts using rank and and Subsidy Subsets using all tests, implying crowding out is not complete. Thus, the results of the Tax experiment weigh against pure altruism, given the incomplete crowding out of recipient endowments. The Subsidy experiment is favorable to the presence of warm glow: the results vary somewhat using the complete Subsidy set, but, using the Subsidy Subset, crowding out is significant across all tests. Collectively, it appears that crowding out occurs but is partial, consistent with something like impure altruism where people care about both the recipient's but are constrained to the corner solution at zero. Of course, one could have constructed the present experiment so that dictators could give negative gifts, i.e., they could steal money from their counterparts. I did not adopt this approach for several reasons, including for the purpose of maintaining comparability with prior dictator experiments and because of evidence from other studies (e.g., Bosman and van Winden 2002, Zizzo and suggesting that taking an amount is a fundamentally different from a similarly sized reduction in a positive gift. Of particular significance for the current study is the fact that the relationship of stealing to feelings appears to be quite distinct from that associated with giving (or giving less). 12 This comparison does not use a zero adjustment since the percentage of zero gifts in the Subsidy treatment is no greater than that in the Standard treatment, indeed it is less by a small and insignificant amount.
allocation and the level of giving per se.
Consider now the Charity experiment. Remember that the Familiarity Hypothesis predicts that gifts will be significantly greater in the Standard treatment than in the Charity treatment. Table 2 indicates that the opposite is the case, according to all tests and using both the Charity and Pooled Charity sets (we will consider Shifted Pooled Charity later in the paper). This cannot be attributed to subject familiarity with the charities, as illustrated in Table 3 . After the allocation decision, each dictator was asked two questions: "Prior to this experiment, had you heard of the organization Childreach? … Children International?" Of the 142 responses in the pooled sample of 71 dictators, only 3% or 1% indicated definite prior knowledge of Childreach or Children International, respectively. A separate question is whether familiarity with a given charity increases the likelihood of giving to that charity. The percentage giving to a charity they definitely know is higher than for the other two categories, but since only three responses (from only two dictators) fall into this category, one cannot draw meaningful conclusions from this number. At any rate, the percentage giving in the "Not Certain" category is almost identical to that in the "No" category. Does familiarity at least increase average giving to the chosen charity?
The results in Table 3 suggest not, as mean gifts are all very close or equal to $6. Thus, these results provide no evidence that familiarity drives the higher level of gifts in the Charity treatment versus the Standard treatment or that, within the Charity treatment, it affects the choice of charity or level of giving.
Additional evidence comes from the response of dictators to the Childreach matching grant program. The matching grant is predicted to increase the fraction of dictators choosing Childreach and to increase the amount given to that charity, if giving is motivated by pure or impure altruism but to have no effect with warm glow alone. Table 4 provides information on these decisions and pair-wise comparisons of them for different versions of this treatment. The "normal" versions, in which a $1 gift produces an equal $1 benefit, form the baseline. The normal versions of Childreach and Children International do not differ significantly with respect to either the proportion of subjects who choose them or average gifts, which is convenient for the benchmark case. Next, the "match" versions involve the forms on which subjects chose between giving to Childreach, and producing fourfold benefits, or to Children International, and producing equal benefits. Here a significantly higher fraction of dictators chooses Childreach with the matching grant in comparison to Childreach without the program or to Children
International in the matching grant scenario. From the bottom row, one sees there is a significant shift away from Children International when subjects are offered the Childreach matching grant versus the case when it is not available. The last three differences count against warm glow but are otherwise consistent with pure or impure altruism. The picture changes, though, when one considers the mean gifts for the final three comparisons. Although the matching grant increases the fraction of people choosing Childreach, it does not significantly increase the average amount they give compared to Childreach without the matching grant or to Children International in the matching grant scenario, indeed, one of these differences is significant in the direction opposite to that predicted by unconditional altruism. Finally, theory makes no predictions about this, but the Children International gifts are significantly greater when Childreach offers a matching program than when it does not. One possible explanation is discussed in section IV. Table 5 summarizes the results on the mean change in short run affect (SRAD) for the three new treatments. Each sample is bifurcated into those dictators whose gifts are at or above those of the median Giver (High Gifts, col. 2) and those whose gifts are below this (Low Gifts, col. 1). Focusing first on the significance of the difference between SRA for these two groups in each treatment (col. 3), we see that those who give less in the Standard and Subsidy treatments experience a significantly bigger boost in SRA (are "happier") than those who give more, in contradiction to warm glow. The Charity treatment provides some support for warm glow, although the higher SRAD of the High Gift group is not significant at conventional levels (P=.12). One question, mentioned previously, concerns the self-selection of dictators into their level of giving, e.g., each person might be giving what makes him or her happiest. To address this, four Control sessions were conducted, in which dictators faced student counterparts but were given no opportunity to share their $10 endowment with them. With an SRAD of 1.87, the Control dictators are happier than almost every other group. Only the low Givers in the Standard treatment experience a larger SRAD, but, as seen in columns 4 and 5 of Table 5 , theirs is not significantly greater, nor is the SRAD of high Givers in the Standard treatment significantly lower than that of the Control. For the Subsidy treatment, the SRAD associated with low gifts does not differ from that of the Control, but high Givers are significantly less happy than the Control. The reverse is true of the Charity treatment where high Givers are not happier than the Control, but there is evidence that low Givers are less happy at the 6% level of significance.
B. Affective Motivation
Regressions of SRAD on gifts, presented in Table 6 , tend to substantiate these conclusions and provide some further insight into the Charity treatment. The unfavorable effect of giving on feelings in the Standard and Subsidy treatments is confirmed by the negative slope coefficient on gifts in col. 2 (using the Subsidy Subset, this coefficient is even steeper, -.31, and more significant). The slope using all dictators in the Charity treatment is positive but not significant at conventional levels (P=.14). Nevertheless, clearer distinctions emerge if one separates those dictators who gave to Childreach in the matching grant version (i.e., those whose gifts were increased by the matching grant multiplier, κ=4) and all others in the Charity treatment (for whom κ=1). Now the slope is more positive and marginally significant (P=.07) for subjects where κ=1 but is almost flat and insignificant for κ=4. The support appears to be somewhat stronger, then, for a favorable effect on feelings in the normal (κ=1) Charity case.
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Thus, the picture is one of "mixed feelings." The results imply that generosity has an unfavorable effect on short run feelings when one's counterparts are students and a favorable effect perhaps only when the counterparts are charities. Moreover, comparison with the feelings of the Control group indicates two important facts. First, these effects are not due to selfselection. Second, no level of generosity significantly improves short run feelings more than the 13 Of course, partitioning samples to make these finer distinctions about SRAD data adversely impacts statistical significance by reducing sample sizes. Power tests conducted after the experiment suggest sample sizes required for conventional significance for certain marginally significant results in Tables 5 and 6 . Consider, for example, the slope coefficients on two regressions in Table 6 : for 5% significance, the N values indicated for powers of 50%/80% are 53/119 in the Charity -All regression and 26/58 in the Charity κ=1 regression. In absence of gift-giving altogether -at best, the chosen level of giving can match that improvement. These findings cast further doubt on warm glow, that is, at least on the standard interpretation of warm glow. Indeed, the collective results on both gifts and feelings reveal inconsistencies with the various theories of unconditional altruism. The following section proposes a more consistent explanation based on a simple modification of the theory.
IV. Conditional Altruism
This section proposes a theory of conditional altruism that offers a means to reconcile findings reported here and elsewhere through a straightforward extension of previous models.
A. Theory of Conditional Altruism
The theory of conditional altruism incorporates a simple, but important, consideration in decisions about giving: a condition, φ , that a donor believes to be the "right" gift to the recipient.
To be more exact, φ is the "right" benefit that the gift should produce (note the two are the same in this study, except in the case of the matching grant charity where the benefit generated is κ times the gift). The version introduced here resembles the model of impure altruism:
where, as before, represents the donor's material utility,
and . Formally, conditional altruism requires only a modification to the second term,
This represents the disutility associated with deviations of the donor's gift, x, from what the donor believes is right, φ . It is assumed that
, and =0. Note that these assumptions imply thatis strictly concave in the gift and is maximized where the donor gives the amount he or she considers right.
Thus, conditional altruism relates to specific obligations, not some general concern for others. As formulated, the preference for giving is not monotonic: ceteris paribus, the donor's utility is increasing in gifts up to φ but decreasing thereafter. This resembles models of inequity aversion, except that it applies generally to social norms and not just to equity. Someone who is donating to a charity, for example, is likely to be motivated by a desire to help others in need, but the argument is that if needs are satisfied (and no other norm kicks in), further donations will decrease the donor's utility. One advantage of this approach is its promise for explaining different levels of generosity across contexts. A notable instance of this is the wide variation in dictator gifts across different runs of this experiment, which might be explained by changes in the perceived social norm across procedures and conditions.
Of course, to possess the promised predictive power, φ must be given some content.
Given the anonymous and non-strategic design of the current dictator experiments, we turn to distributive justice for this.
14 Evidence from various empirical studies (e.g., Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1992 and Konow 2003) suggests that distributive preferences can be traced to three principles: efficiency, equity and need. The emphasis here is on equity and need, the two distributive standards suggested by the context of these experiments as well as by Becker, who cites the "need and disfavor" of others as motivating concerns. The results of many bargaining and distribution experiments point to equity as the salient distributive force between student subjects. Thus, equity is taken to be the reigning distributive principle in the Standard, Subsidy and Tax sessions. Other experimental evidence (e.g., Eckel and Grossman, 1996) finds that, when recipients are known to be charities that service the needy, gifts are significantly greater. This is consistent with the principle of need, which represents a more categorical duty, viz., to satisfy the basic needs of recipients. Thus, in our Charity sessions, need is the relevant principle and is predicted to produce larger gifts than in the other treatments. The efficiency principle applies when total surplus is variable and calls for allocations that maximize surplus. Given the typically fixed sums in this experiment, efficiency is not a prominent feature (although we will discuss some evidence on it from the matching grant version of the Charity experiment).
Can we be more specific about the value of φ across treatments? The potential problem with inferring φ from dictator allocations is that the latter result from a combination of self-26 interest and social preferences. In a series of dictator studies, therefore, Konow and collaborators (Konow, 2000 , Croson and Konow, 2005 , and Konow, Saijo and Akai, 2005 have sought to disentangle these motives by conducting the usual two party dictator (or "stakeholder") treatments parallel to treatments with different groups of subjects in which a third party dictator (or "spectator") is paid a fixed fee to allocate a sum between two other parties. The spectator allocations represent the unbiased φ , i.e., the distributive justice preferences of unbiased individuals, and result in a high level of agreement: about 60% to 90% of their allocations coincide exactly with the point prediction of a single principle. These studies have also produced the following stylized fact: modal gifts of Givers in stakeholder treatments equal the mean gifts of dictators in spectator treatments, i.e., the unbiased φ . That is, although the modal transfer of all dictators in stakeholder treatments is sometimes zero and their mean transfer is less than φ , the modal gift of Givers in these treatments equals φ . Indeed, in the US, a remarkably stable proportion of about one-half of Givers chooses such transfers. In addition, we find in contextually simple experiments with student subjects that equity is the salient principle and that the unbiased φ corresponds to equal splits, consistent with modal allocations of Givers in many other similarly simple allocation and bargaining experiments. 15 Extending this to the Charity treatment in the current study, the unbiased φ according to the need principle should be revealed by the modal transfer of Givers in that treatment.
Although about one-half of Givers routinely allocate the unbiased φ , taking account of a subtlety in this connection will later prove useful in explaining additional variation in allocations.
In the current experiment, φ represents the dictator's belief about the right recipient benefit that his gift should produce. This can differ from the unbiased φ of spectators, though, since many stakeholders have biased beliefs about what is right (see, e.g., Babcock, et al., 1995) . Konow 27 15 This follows from the mean allocations of spectators and the modal transfers of Givers in stakeholder treatments. Indeed, with respect to the latter, 53% of allocations in the Standard/Exogenous treatment in Konow (2000) and 50% of allocations in the Random Y treatment of Croson and Konow (2005) produced equal splits of the total stakes. One possibility, of course, is that equal splits are a focal point, but we see that these patterns persist even when equity calls for unequal allocations. In other treatments subjects first generated earnings through a task where equity calls for earnings to be proportional to contributions, as confirmed by the allocations of spectators. In parallel stakeholder treatments, the allocations of 48% of Givers obeyed the proportionality rule exactly in both the Standard/Discretionary treatment of Konow (2000) and in the US Individual Spectator treatment of Konow, Saijo and Akai (2005) . (2000) found almost two-thirds of dictators in stakeholder treatments allocate their beliefs, but average beliefs are significantly biased in a self-serving way. Nevertheless, as proven there, biased beliefs vary directly with impartial norms, and formally allowing for this bias does not fundamentally alter the theoretical results that follow. Acknowledging some heterogeneity and bias in beliefs does, however, help explain certain patterns in the results discussed below.
The Tax experiment can now be reformulated in terms of conditional altruism. The maximization problem is
Applying equity to determine φ , the total amount, M , should be divided equally, which requires that the dictator's gift by adjusted downward by e, the share of the total the recipient already possesses. This leads to Proposition 4 about crowding out in the Tax experiment, c t .
PROPOSITION 4: Assuming conditional altruism, crowding out in the Tax experiment is partial,
i.e., -1 < c t < 0.
PROOF:
Substituting the constraints into the utility function, the first order condition with respect to x is
Solving , substituting and differentiating with respect to e gives ) (
Rearranging, we arrive at the following
Note that these results parallel those for impure altruism (and that, but for warm glow, crowding out would be complete).
Conditional altruism generates more distinctive predictions in the Subsidy and Charity experiments. For the Subsidy experiment, the constraints are X + x = E , E + e = M and φ equals 
Solving , substituting, differentiating and rearranging, we find
In addition, note that crowding out in the Subsidy experiment is also predicted to be less than one-half that in the Tax experiment (½c t < c s ).
The predictions of conditional altruism for the Charity experiment concern the effect on gifts of variations in, not e, but φ , as stated in Proposition 6. 
Substituting the constraints into the utility function, and differentiating with respect to x gives
, substituting and differentiating with respect to φ yields
Rearranging, one finds
Note that this partial adjustment of x to φ holds even if the warm glow term were not present.
Of course, conditional altruism is no different from pure or impure altruism in predicting that a larger fraction of subjects will choose Childreach when it offers a matching grant program:
as long as subjects are free to choose their level of giving, a matching grant makes a charity more 
With the matching grant, a gift of x dollars generates κ x dollars of the benefit to the recipient, such that the conditional altruism term becomes ) (
. The first order condition is now
, differentiating and rearranging produces (and this hurdle is even lower if φ is less than $10 in the normal version).
16 This is opposed to the prediction of unconditional altruism that a matching grant will always increase giving.
B. Reconciliation with Allocation Decisions
In this section we consider how the theory of conditional altruism proposed above performs in accounting for the results on allocation decisions. Examining first the modal gifts of Givers in Table 1 , the results with student subjects are consistent with equal splits in every instance: $5 in the Standard, $3 in the Subsidy, $5 in the Tax 15/5 and $8 in the Tax 18/2 16 One might argue that an increase in κ will prompt φ to rise, perhaps because the perceived obligation to meet recipient need rises or out of an efficiency concern for increasing total surplus by giving more. Even in this case, though, it can be shown that m eventually turns negative as long as φ d dx * <1, which was proven in Proposition 6.
treatment. The higher modal gift in the Charity treatment than the Standard and Subsidy treatments is as expected and implies an unbiased φ of $10.
Turning now to mean allocations, for the Tax and Subsidy experiments, the predictions of conditional altruism differ from those of pure altruism or warm glow and are consistent with, but more specific than, those of impure altruism. Gifts in the 15/5 treatment of the Tax experiment are less than in the 18/2 treatment, but not by the full $3 difference implied by pure altruism or by the change in φ . This is consistent with the partial shifts reported in Table 2 . Conditional altruism and impure altruism also imply the partial crowding out found in the Subsidy experiment, consistent with the Table 2 results. Conditional altruism, however, additionally predicts crowding out in the Subsidy experiment of less than one-half (-½ < c s ) and, more specifically, less than one-half of that in the Tax experiment (½c t < c s ). The differences in zeroadjusted mean gifts in Table 2 imply average crowding out of -.48 in the Tax experiment and of -.18 in the Subsidy experiment, consistent with these predictions. For the Charity experiment, unconditional altruism predicts no difference between the Standard and Charity treatments (without interjecting additional assumptions), although the Familiarity Hypothesis does predict higher gifts in the Standard treatment. Nevertheless, as previously discussed, Table 2 shows that average gifts are greater in the (Pooled) Charity than in the Standard treatment. Proposition 6, on the other hand, predicts this as well as the fact that giving does not change by the full $5 difference in φ (from $5 in Standard to $10 in Charity). The latter is suggested by comparing the Standard treatment with the Shifted Pooled Charity treatment, which shifts the Pooled Charity distribution down by $5 to max [0, x−5] . This difference is significant at conventional levels by two of the three tests and is weakly significant by the third. Note that in terms of explaining allocations, the warm glow term serves much the same function here as in impure altruism: it predicts the incomplete crowding out in the Tax and Subsidy experiments. Of particular relevance for conditional altruism, however, it also provides a rationale for the gifts sometimes observed that exceed φ : these are the subjects for whom g ′ > u′ + f ′ at x=φ .
Turning to the effect of the matching grant on charitable giving, the relative proportions in Table 4 are consistent with both conditional altruism and pure or impure altruism. The latter two theories, however, predict that average gifts will be greater with the matching grant, whereas conditional altruism allows that they be the same or lower. Since conditional altruism involves distinct motives for giving, eliciting subject reasons for their allocative decisions can also prove meaningful. Dictators, therefore, answered the following open-ended question in a post-experimental questionnaire: "Why did you put the amount of dollar bills that you did in the Return envelope?" Some subjects also addressed this in 17 The one finding not predicted by any theory of conditional or unconditional altruism is the significantly higher average gifts to Children International when Childreach offers a matching grant. One conjecture about this is that subjects with a stronger preference for a specific charity also tend to give more to that charity. In that case, those who are left giving to Children International even when Childreach has a matching grant are the more generous Children International donors.a second question that was posed in the Pooled Charity sessions: "Again regarding your payment decision, why did you donate to the organization that you did (leave this blank if you did not donate any money)?" The results are summarized in Table 7 . Reasons for giving were asked in all Pooled Charity sessions and in all but two Standard and one Subsidy session, where they were inadvertently omitted. The Standard and Subsidy results have been consolidated for this reason and because these two treatments are both assumed to be motivated by the same norm (moreover, the unbiased φ as well as the actual mean gifts differ by a small amount across these samples). Responses were coded as "Explicit Equity/Equality" if dictators explicitly explained their decisions using the terms "fair," "equal" or "even" or their synonyms or cognates. "NeedExplicit" reasons indicate dictators explicitly used the word "need" or its cognates. The "NeedImplicit" category refers to appeals to need (sometimes that of the dictator) that did not explicitly use the word "need." 19 The answers of most dictators fall into one of these categories, although other subjects provided more idiosyncratic reasons that are not easily coded. Need is the most common response in the Pooled Charity sessions (45%), and equity/equality in the Standard + Subsidy sessions (37%), although a fair number in these sessions also mentioned need (20%).
It is more illuminating to examine reasons by level of dictator generosity. Table 8 shows the reasons for giving according to whether the dictator's gift is low or high, whereby the split point is constructed for each set of treatments so as to divide the dictators as closely as possible into equally sized groups. Need combines here explicit and implicit responses but is subdivided into those who appealed to their Own Need versus those whose decisions were based on Others'
Need. Among dictators with High gifts, it is notable that around two-thirds in each of the treatment sets volunteer reasons consistent with the predicted conditional altruistic motive, viz., Equity/Equality in the Standard + Subsidy treatments and Others' Need in the Pooled Charity treatments. Only 8% to 9% of dictators who give Low gifts, on the other hand, mention these reasons in the respective treatment sets. Instead, the most frequently identifiable reason among 33 these groups is their Own Need. In particular, such dictators employ this argument more often in the Standard + Subsidy treatments (46%) than in the Pooled Charity treatments (29%).
These results suggest that more generous dictators are motivated by impartial distributive principles, whereas less generous dictators often interpret these norms in a biased manner in order to rationalize their self-serving behavior. Another possibility is that the claims of less generous dictators regarding their own need are legitimate. We can examine this through two questions on material well-being that were included in the post-experimental questionnaire. For a subject pool consisting of university students, income is a problematic measure of material wellbeing since most income is earned, and it is likely that the students with higher incomes are those who are working their way through college precisely because they are less well off. Instead, two other questions were asked: Expenditures, which asked about total expenditures in dollars during the current school year, and Parents' Income, which asked subjects to estimate gross income in the previous year of parents or guardians to within $25,000 by choosing one of seven categories (the highest was $150,000 or more). Using these measures, we find that, in the Pooled Charity treatments, less generous dictators who appeal to own need report mean Expenditures of $28,200
and mean Parents' Income of 3.6 (around $78,000), whereas these numbers for more generous dictators who refer to others' need are $28,440 and 3.9 (around $85,000), respectively, which represent insignificant differences (P=.96 and P=.65, respectively) . In the Standard + Subsidy treatments, the less generous dictators who argue for own need are actually better off materially than the more generous dictators who explain themselves based on equity. The respective mean
Expenditures and Parents' Income of the former are $32,840 and 4.5 (about $100,000) and of the latter are $32,390 and 3.5 (about $75,000), although only the latter difference even approaches weak significance (P=.89 and P=.12). Thus, these results produce no evidence that less generous dictators have a basis in fact for their decisions but rather suggest that these claims are merely self-serving arguments.
C. Affective Motivation: Reconciliation and Indications for Further Research
The evidence in section III on crowding out and feelings supports Andreoni's modification of the utility function to reflect gift size as well as his claim of a role for feelings in altruism. Nevertheless, the results on short run feelings are mixed. Contrary to warm glow, generosity is negatively correlated with SRAD when counterparts are student cohorts, although there are indications of a positive correlation when counterparts are charities. Conditional altruism offers a means of reconciling these results by making, not only allocation decisions, but also feelings, dependent on the relevant social norm. As Adam Smith proposed in the quote at the start of this paper, behavior based on social preferences can be understood with respect to two different but interrelated aspects: in relation to its affective motivation and in relation to the effect it seeks to produce. Becker (1974) associates feelings with benefits to recipients and does so specifically in his discussion of what he calls "charity," i.e., contributions to unrelated persons or organizations, precisely the domain that conditional altruism claims. Citing the definition of charity as "the benevolent feeling, especially toward those in need or disfavor," he relates feelings associated with giving to social conditions. Consistent with this and the stylized facts about feelings, the conditional altruism hypothesis is that better feelings are associated with gifts that comply with (beliefs about) the relevant social norm.
Andreoni (2004) makes a different point that, nevertheless, complements the conditional altruism story: most giving is preceded by the creation of a social obligation that potentially decreases utility. For example, obligations are created by mail and media solicitations by charities and labor contract negotiations. People might prefer to avoid the obligation, but, when it occurs, the positive marginal utility of giving relieves this disutility to some degree. Andreoni asks "do the positive feelings of giving outweigh the negative feelings of the burdens of obligation and guilt?" (pg. 26). In the current study, the comparison of affect change in treatments with that in the Control (where no obligation is created) suggests that giving the "right" amount offsets the effect of the obligation but that giving other amounts might not.
20 20 This explanation can also help reconcile evidence Dana, Weber and Kuang (2004) produce that some subjects prefer to avoid information about fairness: these subjects might wish to avoid the utility decreasing obligation. This is not actually evidence against a preference for fairness or other social preferences; instead it is completely consistent with the formulation here, as well as that of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) , where the social preference term in the utility function is always non-positive, so that agents might prefer that it not be activated.
Consider the evidence on gifts, φ and short run feelings. Figure 2 represents the plots of SRAD on gifts, whereby the dark lines are the fitted lines for linear regressions previously summarized in Table 6 (we will discuss the lighter lines momentarily). The lowest φ is in the Subsidy treatment with an impartial value of $3, illustrated in Figure 2a , the case for which the slope of the regression is most negative at -0.28 (-0.31 for the Subsidy subset). The Standard treatment, in Figure 2b , has an impartial φ of $5, and the slope is slightly less negative at -0.26.
For the Charity κ = 4 in Figure 2c , theory predicts conditions under which giving is lower than without a matching grant, but it does not specify a value for φ in this case. Nevertheless, with an average gift of $5.43 in this version, however, one can deduce that the average φ is greater than in the Standard case, and now the fitted line essentially flattens out with a slope of 0.04. Finally, in the Charity versions without the matching grant, the impartial φ is the greatest at $10, and the slope of the regression turns positive at 0.15. This pattern, then, is consistent with the hypothesis that better feelings are associated with low gifts when φ is low and high gifts when φ is high.
Can one be more specific about the relationship between feelings and social norms? This section concludes with some ideas about this. The discussion that follows, however, is not put forth as a formal test of these conjectures (which goes beyond the scope of the current study and the capabilities of the data it has produced), but rather as a tentative suggestion and as inspiration for further research. In particular, suppose short run feelings are associated, not with the ) (⋅ g term, but through their relationship to social norm compliance as represented by the term.
Equation (5) retains the warm glow term, and, as before, we assume
now it is not presumed to be motivated by desire to improve short run affect.
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Returning to the term, as formulated gift giving can at best reduce the negative impact on short run feelings of deviations from Figure 2 , the lighter lines are fitted lines for nonlinear regressions motivated by this conjecture. Given the rather noisy data, the small number 36 21 This does not, however, rule out a different rationale for g(x) consistent with Andreoni's emphasis on feelings. The objective behind this term could be favorable long run affect: Konow and Earley (2005) argue that giving is like an investment that contributes to the donor's long run well-being and happiness, even if it does not do so in the short run. In this case, this warm glow term represents the value a donor places on current giving in the interests of increasing future well-being, as distinct from the effect of giving on current happiness (or short run affect).
of observations (especially away from hypothesized φ values) in the partitioned subsets, and the additional independent variable in the nonlinear regressions, the coefficients of these regressions are not significant at conventional levels. Nevertheless, by their consistency with our conjecture, they suggest a way to reconcile enigmatic results and an avenue for future investigations.
Beginning with the Subsidy treatment in Figure 2a although it is not concave, whereas the second line has both the predicted slopes and concavity.
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Finally, consider the Charity treatment. According to Proposition 7, a matching grant changes the optimal gift, specifically, it should lower giving under the parameters of this experiment. Thus, we separate the subjects who donated a positive amount to Childreach under the matching grant program (Charity κ = 4) from all other dictators in the Charity treatment (Charity κ = 1) in Figures 2c and 2d , respectively. Both of these groups are also partitioned into dictators who gave less than $2 and those who gave $2 or more. For the Charity κ = 4 group, the linear regression indicates no relationship between SRAD and giving, whereas the nonlinear regression suggests SRAD is a concave function of gifts among more generous Givers that is maximized at $6.25. For the Charity κ = 1 group, the linear regression produces a positive slope and the nonlinear regression among more generous Givers a concave function that peaks at around $14.25 (which could partially explain the two dictators to whom it occurred not only to
give their $10 endowment but also to dip into their show-up fees). These results are consistent with beliefs about the right gift at $0 and at positive values that vary with κ in the manner predicted by conditional altruism. In addition to the reasons for gifts summarized already on Table 8 , there is a shred of evidence on efficiency: 86% of the dictators who gave to Childreach in the matching grant version pointed in the post-experimental questionnaire to the increased benefit as a reason for choosing that charity.
The maxima of the nonlinear regressions, then, are all consistent with the hypotheses of conditional altruism about φ , and four out of five even display the predicted concavity. Now, if we examine the relationship between the fitted linear regression lines to the hypothesized underlying nonlinear functions, the changing slopes of the former can be explained by what I will call a "lever effect." That is, think of the concave function around the average φ as the fulcrum and the linear regression as a lever arm at rest. Then the fulcrum is moving progressively from left to right as φ increases in Figures 2a through 2d , and the slope of the "lever arm" changes from negative to zero to positive. Of course, there are "mini-fulcrums"
around the biased beliefs, mostly at $0, that reinforce the slope for the Subsidy and Standard cases or offset it somewhat for the Charity κ = 1 case. In fact, if one removes the $0 observations from the latter case, the slope of the linear regression becomes steeper (.22) and borderline significant (P=.06), despite the small number of remaining observations (N=26). Thus, the shift of the right gift, and the term with it, suggest a means of accounting for the mixed feelings observed in different treatments of this experiment.
V. Conclusions
This study seeks to produce cleaner evidence on altruism by employing a double blind dictator design that minimizes the confounding effects of prestige, status, confusion, expectations, and strategic motives. The results suggest that crowding out is partial and that giving is not motivated by pure altruism or by warm glow alone. In particular, pure warm glow giving is refuted by several new tests, including the Subsidy experiment and versions of the Charity experiment. In addition, the Charity experiment results indicate that greater generosity toward charities versus student cohorts cannot be attributed primarily to greater familiarity with the former. The new experiments also introduce a short run affect scale as a direct measure of warm glow. The results on feelings are mixed: greater generosity can be associated with worse or possibly better feelings, depending on the conditions. By extending previous models of altruism, conditional altruism offers a means of reconciling these results by proposing that both the optimal gift and the affective motivation are conditioned on patterned social norms.
Conditional altruism provides explanations for many findings beyond those that have already been discussed here. Evidence of altruistic behavior conditioned on the efficiency principle is also apparent in the attempts of decision makers to maximize surplus in the experiments of Andreoni and Miller (2002) , Charness and Grosskopf (2001) , Charness and Rabin (2002) , Hoffman and Spitzer (1985) and Kritikos and Bolle (2001) . Holm and Engseld (2001) and Kravitz and Gunto (1992) find that players in ultimatum games are more generous toward counterparts who are portrayed as more needy. The important and rapidly growing literature on trust and reciprocity (see, for example, Fehr and Gächter 2000) also rests on preferences conditioned by social norms. Combining this with the emerging evidence on the role of emotions from this and other studies offers a promising approach for understanding altruism. (4) of (1) of (2) (6) v. (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
